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Abstract
Globalization’s “interconnecting” effects have blended with an ethos of
instability to create an extraordinarily complex global security
environment. Though the number of armed conflicts worldwide has
declined since the early 1990s, the character of those conflicts has
evolved in some troubling ways. Conventional inter-state wars are less
common, but they have been displaced by a proliferation of smaller scale,
asymmetric, diffuse and episodic struggles: What Trinquier calls
“subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare.” The participants in these
conflicts are not limited to national military forces, but include a range of
non-state actors, including militias, ethnic groups, illicit transnational
networks, informal paramilitary organizations, and violent extremists.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/2
Many of today’s most vexing global threats, including those that affect
the United States’ national security interests, emanate from terrorist
networks, transnational criminal organizations, rogue states, and the
intersection of activities and shared objectives among malicious actors
operating from frontiers or “ungoverned spaces.” Special Operations
Forces (SOF) have had an essential, but evolving, role in countering
those threats.
The articles assembled in this issue of Journal of Strategic Security
examine SOF’s role in the global, joint force of the future. Through a
military-academic partnership between U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM) and the University of South Florida, five papers
have been selected for the purpose of further developing dialogue on
issues related to SOF’s pivot toward partnership-driven, indirect action.
Some common themes emerge in these works: a view that future security
rests in partnerships, and an acknowledgement that the threats,
constraints, and realities of the current strategic environment demand
applications of “smart power” to assure collective security.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss2/2
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Introduction 
Globalization’s “interconnecting” effects have blended with an ethos of instability 
to create an extraordinarily complex global security environment.  Though the 
number of armed conflicts worldwide has declined since the early 1990s,1 the 
character of those conflicts has evolved in some troubling ways.  Conventional 
inter-state wars are less common, but they have been displaced by a proliferation 
of smaller scale, asymmetric, diffuse and episodic struggles: What Trinquier calls 
“subversive warfare or revolutionary warfare.”2  The participants in these 
conflicts are not limited to national military forces, but include a range of non-
state actors, including militias, ethnic groups, illicit transnational networks, 
informal paramilitary organizations, and violent extremists.  Many of today’s 
most vexing global threats, including those that affect the United States’ national 
security interests, emanate from terrorist networks, transnational criminal 
organizations, rogue states, and the intersection of activities and shared 
objectives among malicious actors operating from frontiers or “ungoverned 
spaces.”3  Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had an essential, but evolving, 
role in countering those threats.   
 
When Admiral William H. McRaven assumed command of U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 2011, he initiated a rigorous process 
assessing how to best position and sustain United States SOF to meet current and 
future challenges to U.S. national security.  Guiding the assessment was an 
assumption that “there are no local problems;”4 solutions, therefore, must come 
through cooperating, collaborating, and building capacity with partner nations.  
McRaven referred to the product of that assessment as the Global SOF Network 
strategy.  
 
The World of Action – Direct and Indirect 
Since September 11, 2001, the public has generally pictured SOF as a cadre of 
elite warriors maneuvering in the dark of night, breaking down doors and 
apprehending terrorists.  Those direct action activities are indeed among U.S. 
SOF’s specialties, but their role is much broader and includes a range of indirect 
operations as well.  Every day, in over 75 countries around the world, U.S. SOF 
work with partner nations to build the capabilities of indigenous special 
operations forces to better confront the threat of violent extremism, terrorism 
and other threat networks.  In addition to building foreign internal defense, U.S. 
SOF regularly deploy throughout the world on humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief missions, providing vital medical services to underserved 
                                                        
1 Hewitt, J., Wilkenfield, J., & T.R. Gurr, T.R., Peace and Conflict (Boulder, CO:  Paradigm 
Publishers, 2010).  
2 Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2006). 
3 Clunan, A. and Trinkunas, H., “Conceptualizing Ungoverned Spaces” in Ungoverned Spaces: 
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010). 
4 Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, USN, Commander, United States Special 
Operations Command, Before the 113th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. 
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populations and aid to communities devastated by natural disasters.  These 
indirect actions are the backbone of the Global SOF Network.  
 
Working with and through partner forces is the hallmark of SOF’s indirect 
approach.  Adhering to the support role is critical in these operations.  Host 
nations must take the lead.  Host forces best understand the threats, the local 
operating environment, the population; and they can anticipate the secondary 
effects of intervention.  When U.S. SOF train and build capacity within host 
nation forces, they simultaneously enable enduring, adaptive solutions and 
enhance the reach and depth of SOF intelligence and operations against shared 
problems.   
 
SOF are expanding their indirect missions as they increasingly seek to intervene 
earlier in the continuum of military operations. For several years, the U.S. 
Department of Defense has used the term “Phase Zero” operations to refer to the 
pre-conflict phase of armed struggles. Phase Zero activity is almost always part of 
a joint interagency operation, and is most often conducted in partnership with 
host nation forces. The operations aim to identify and remediate early indicators 
of instability and disorder, and shape the operating environment before 
deteriorating conditions make conflict inevitable.   These tasks draw on 
diplomacy and development assistance, not just on military tactical skill.  Phase 
Zero operations employ a “strategic diplomacy” for which interagency 
partnerships within and across U.S. agencies are as important as connections 
between U.S. and host nation forces. 
 
Operational success in countering current threats and preventing future conflict 
lies in a whole-of-government approach.  SOF represents just one component.  
SOF must coordinate and synchronize efforts with interagency partners, both 
domestically and with the interagencies of partner nations.  The Global SOF 
Network strategy strives to pursue a multidimensional, coordinated and de-
conflicted approach to achieve strategic priorities and maximize resources in 
today’s constrained fiscal environment.   
 
As the U.S. military transitions from a protracted war, USSOCOM is re-focusing 
its efforts, believing that by remaining engaged with the world and allied partners 
in a positive, productive manner, the U.S. can make strides towards deterring 
aggression and malicious actors worldwide.  The Global SOF Network provides 
the U.S. with an agile, flexible presence abroad, founded on partnerships and 
mutual trust.  It allows for U.S. presence to be networked and globally 
coordinated, as are the adversaries that pose a threat to U.S. national security 
and interests.  
 
The ongoing drawdown of troops in Afghanistan makes available more U.S. SOF 
to pursue indirect operations designed to increase security and prevent areas of 
instability from deteriorating into large-scale contingencies.  This is being done 
through a strategy of engagement, not attrition.  Working with allies empowers 
them to confront and combat the threats originating within their own borders, 
preventing local issues from escalating into global problems.  
 
SOF’s pivot to indirect operations requires a concomitant shift in resources and a 
new program of professional education to prepare the next generation of SOF 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 2
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leaders.  President Obama, recognizing the importance of global partnerships and 
indirect operations, called on Congress in May 2014 to support a new 
counterterrorism partnership fund to “allow us to train, build capacity and 
facilitate partner countries on the front lines.”5 
 
While U.S. SOF operators are the most skilled in the world at hostage rescue and 
kill and capture missions, these direct action missions by themselves have a 
limited ability to create a safer, more stable world and protect U.S. interests at 
home and abroad.  The future of SOF, in accordance with Presidential direction 
and as envisioned in the Global SOF Network initiative, lies in joint operations, 
with U.S. SOF operating by, with, and through its interagency and international 
partners.  
 
Persistent Engagement and Building Trust 
USSOCOM’s success in leveraging worldwide partnerships to create a global 
network requires a foundation of mutual trust.  Ensuring returns on those 
partnership investments requires enduring engagement.  An oft-repeated adage 
at USSOCOM is: “You can’t surge trust.”  Trust, by definition, requires a 
willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based on confident expectations 
regarding another’s behavior.   Being regarded as trustworthy is a distinction that 
must be earned.  Research on trustworthiness consistently identifies three major 
predictors:  ability (perceptions of a trustee’s competence and consistency), 
benevolence (perceptions of the trustee’s caring, goodwill, empathy, and 
commitment to shared goals), and integrity (perceptions of the trustee’s 
objectivity, fairness, honesty, and dedication)6.  From that perspective, the deck 
appears stacked in favor of U.S. SOF as a highly skilled, reliable cadre of 
operators, collaborating with partners to prevent and solve shared problems.  But 
trust still must be built.  Partnership investments, whether though foreign 
internal defense or development support, should be made early and persistently, 
allowing for personal relationships to deepen and mature through recurrent 
cooperative efforts. U.S. SOF can network and coordinate with partner forces to 
maintain an agile and flexible global presence, accomplishing more with less.   
 
A positive, forward step for the Global SOF Network came in February 2013, 
when USSOCOM was granted authority over the Theater Special Operations 
Commands, effectively streamlining the command relationship between the 
strategic headquarters and the SOF deployed in theater.  This change gave 
USSOCOM greater responsibility for resourcing and organizing U.S. SOF 
worldwide, but not greater authority to deploy and direct them.  Operational 
command and control over deployed SOF remains the sole purview of the 
Geographic Combatant Commanders.   
 
The Global SOF Network, in essence, is a strategy to reorganize U.S. SOF 
worldwide and refocus on training, partnership, and collaborative missions.  The 
Global SOF Network vision aligns U.S. SOF regionally, promotes persistent 
                                                        
5 “Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address at West Point,” New York Times, May 
28, 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/politics/transcript-of-president-
obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point.html?_r=0. 
6 Borum, Randy, The Science Of Interpersonal Trust (McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, 2010). 
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partnerships, and where logical, supports forward basing.  A key component of 
the strategy involves integrating foreign partners into the network.  To that end, 
Admiral McRaven has integrated international SOF Liaison Officers at 
USSOCOM headquarters to facilitate communication and information sharing 
between U.S. SOF and their partners, and strengthen partnerships through 
engagements and training opportunities.  After the recent 13 years of combat in 
coalition environments, U.S. SOF have reached unprecedented levels of 
interoperability and coordination with in-theater partners.  Headquarters-based 
liaison officers bring this tactical and operational interoperability to the strategic 
level, maintaining the progress achieved through tactical/battlefield partnerships 
and furthering the ability to communicate, de-conflict, and coordinate across the 
Global SOF Network.   
 
Prevention: The New Containment? 
In 1946, George Kennan wrote an 8,000 word telegram to Secretary of State 
James Byrnes in response to a U.S. Treasury Department query about why the 
Soviet Union was not supporting the newly created International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank. Kennan’s message, now referred to as the “long telegram,” 
outlined a policy of “containment”—preventing or containing the spread of 
communism—that would become the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward the Soviet 
Union for the next 45 years.  Kennan concluded that Soviet strategy was 
“impervious to logic of reason” but “highly sensitive to logic of force,” so they 
typically would withdraw when they encountered significant resistance.   The idea 
was that by shaping the Soviet Union’s surrounding environment through 
development initiatives and multi-lateral alignments such as the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the U.S. could create a virtual wall around the Soviet 
Union that would thwart and deter its expansion.  Today, the threat is not so 
monolithic, nor is it emanating solely from state actors, yet the logic of 
containment, in some form, resonates.  That which is to be “contained” is not so 
much a state whose socio-political ideology is antithetical to our own, but a set of 
warlord-led, feudalistic movements operating in ungoverned spaces and driven 
by an anti-Enlightenment mindset.  
 
Plan Colombia, for example, a U.S. foreign aid program, may be seen as a form of 
containment whereby the U.S. provided both economic and military assistance 
aimed at suppressing violence, corrosive effects of corruption attending the illicit 
narcotics trade, and a roiling insurgency that threatened the country’s stability. 
On the whole, Plan Colombia has been successful in reducing the narcotics trade 
and facilitating peace talks, effectively quelling the diffuse proliferation of 
criminal violence that threatened the future of the Colombian state.  The Global 
SOF Network relies on similar indirect approaches by engaging with host nation 
partners and targeting precursors to massive instability and inter-group conflict. 
These operations are designed not only to contain clusters of disruption and 
disorder, but also to prevent them from threatening state sovereignty and 
escalating into large scale wars.     
 
Contributions of the Special Issue 
The articles assembled in this issue of Journal of Strategic Security examine 
SOF’s role in the global, joint force of the future.  Through a military-academic 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 2
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partnership between U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the 
University of South Florida, five papers have been selected for the purpose of 
further developing dialogue on issues related to SOF’s pivot toward partnership-
driven, indirect action.  Some common themes emerge in these works:  a view 
that future security rests in partnerships, and an acknowledgement that the 
threats, constraints, and realities of the current strategic environment demand 
applications of “smart power” to assure collective security. 
 
One critical issue in future force planning is improving coordination and 
relationships among institutions that constitute the security interagency.  
Christopher Lamb highlights the imperative of multilateral and interagency 
collaboration to effectively navigate the current threat environment with not only 
a direct, but also a very robust indirect approach.  Successful indirect operations 
require a high degree of interagency collaboration.  Identifying the key 
mechanisms and operating characteristics that support those connections is 
critical. Lamb points to the success of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-
South as one potential exemplar of interagency success.  The JIATF-South began 
in 1994 to support counter-narcotics operations in South America.  Key operating 
characteristics contributing to JIATF-South’s continued success were replicated 
by General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, as well as in other task 
forces.  Lamb draws upon the interagency lessons McChrystal outlines in his 
autobiography,7 which highlight the importance of 1) collaboration at all levels, 2) 
reorganization of the sponsoring organization (such as SOF) to accommodate 
collaboration and sharing, 3) end-to-end mission planning that focuses on the 
seams of interagency coordination to ensure follow-through and completion of 
tasks and operations, and 4) delegation of authority to the lowest levels of the 
organization (what is referred to frequently as “mission command”).  
 
In his contribution, Paul Rexton Kan investigates the nexus between narcotics 
and other drivers of instability and conflict, and details an approach for SOF to 
integrate counter-drug operations with actions against other national security 
threats.  Kan notes that illicit drug trafficking produces approximately $600 
billion in profit annually and accounts for 7.5% of annual global trade.  He 
highlights the vexing connections that exist between groups involved in drug 
trafficking, and those propagating violent extremism as a means to achieve 
political, ideological or religious goals.  The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Movement 
for Unity and Jihad (MUJAO) as well as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
in West Africa have all used proceeds from the drug trade to purchase arms, pay 
for expertise that increases their operational effectiveness, and attract recruits 
with promises of prosperity.  Kan argues that counternarcotics operations are not 
an end itself, but a means to countering violent extremism by cutting off vital 
financial support.  
 
Emily Spencer demonstrates that cultural intelligence or cross-cultural 
competence of special operations forces is a necessary condition for success in 
pre-conflict, partnership-building activities.  Spencer defines cultural 
intelligence, or cross cultural competence, as “the ability to recognize the shared 
beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviors of a group of people and, most 
                                                        
7 McChrystal, Stanley, My Share of the Task (New York, NY: Penguin, 2013).  
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importantly, to apply this knowledge toward a specific goal.”  Spencer argues that 
the concept of cultural intelligence is not new, but to be effective in military 
applications, it must be understood and employed “in the context of the national, 
international, host nation, and enemy domains.”  
 
Whitney Grespin notes that while U.S. SOF are, and should always remain, the 
world’s most capable direction action force, they are also adept and trained in 
partner-nation capacity building.  Grespin argues that “[a]n investment in 
partner nation capacity building now is a down payment against terrorist attacks 
and costly ground engagements in the future.”  Furthermore, building partner 
capacity expands America’s options for protecting its own national security 
interests.  Grespin points out that in Iraq and Afghanistan SOF worked 
predominantly in direct action, at the expense of security assistance and capacity-
building activities.  During these conflicts, responsibility for indirect action such 
as village stability operations (VSO), was given to general purpose forces.  This 
represents “a fundamental shift in responsibility for the conventional forces, as 
SOF forces have historically specialized in enabling partner nation foreign 
military capacity through the teaching of technical fighting and military 
administration skills while mitigating destabilizing drivers of conflict.”  Grespin 
warns that it is important for the U.S. to preserve SOF’s capacity-building 
capability as they are uniquely skilled to carry out such missions at a relatively 
low-cost and with a small operational footprint.  Comprising just 1.7% of the total 
U.S. defense budget, SOF provides a significant return on the defense and 
preventive security investment.  
 
In a reprint of his article that first appeared in Prism (the journal of the Center 
for Complex Operations at National Defense University), Scott Morrison 
describes a need to recalibrate the operational concepts of direct and indirect 
approach “from a broader strategic vantage point.”  Morrison points out that the 
direct and indirect approaches are not separate, compartmentalized tactics but 
are part of a continuous, strategic move, arc or campaign.  Citing Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart’s insights on the power of the indirect approach in strategy, Morrison states 
that SOF power may be used as an “economy of force instrument to upset an 
adversary’s equilibrium and balance through proactive and preventative 
insertion, presence, and action in coordination with a multinational collaborative 
network of SOF networks.”  Morrison invokes John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s 
conclusion that in the future security environment “it will likely take networks to 
fight networks, much as, in an earlier era, it took tanks to fight tanks.”8 
 
A Global SOF Network represents the cornerstone of a new, prevention-oriented 
security posture.  As special operations forces around the world collaborate in 
prosecuting complex problems, a new synergy emerges that is stronger than the 
sum of its parts.   Through persistent support and engagement, U.S. SOF can 
continue to build trust among their international partners.  They can not only 
train host national forces, but also empower them, to better defend their interests 
and secure their local spaces.  They are able to not only share skills and tactics, 
but also the ability to analyze and solve security problems.  Navigating and 
adapting in unfamiliar environments; engaging, partnering and building trust; 
                                                        
8 Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 57. 
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and problem solving amidst uncertainty will be core competencies for a globally 
networked SOF postured to combat the threats of today, and of the future. 
  
Keenan Yoho 
Tess deBlanc-Knowles 
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